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1 Introduction
International capital movements have been characterized by many changes in the last 15
years. These changes can be summarized by four facts. 1) The current account of the
emerging and developing countries (EME countries hereafter) has turned from a deficit to
a hefty surplus after 1998 (see Figure 1). The increasing gap observed in the 2000s between
the current account deficit of the advanced economies (AE countries hereafter) and the
current account surplus of the EME countries has been called ”global imbalances”.1 2)
The current account reversal in the EME countries occurred after many of these countries
experienced balance of payment crises in the 1990s. 3) Global imbalances have reduced
drastically since 2008 when the financial crisis erupted in the AE countries. 4) Both in
1998 and 2008, the saving rate in the EME countries changed more abruptly than the
investment rate while the two rates followed closely the same path in the AE countries
(see Figure 2).
The first fact has been studied extensively in the literature. The most influential ex-
planation was proposed by Bernanke (2005) who argued that the emergence of global
imbalances was mainly due to a sharp increase in the saving rate in the EME countries.
This is the so-called “global saving glut” hypothesis, which contradicted the common
view that the large U.S. current account deficit in the 2000s was caused by U.S. domestic
policies. The question is why the rise in saving in the EME countries did not translate
in as much domestic investment in these countries. One possible answer is the underde-
velopment of their financial markets, which leads savers to search for diversified stores of
value in the U.S or other western asset markets (Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008)
and Mendoza, Quadrini, and R´ıos-Rull (2009)). Another possible answer is government
intervention in international asset markets to accumulate foreign exchange reserves in
order to stave off balance-of-payments crises (see, for instance, Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan,
and Volosovych (2011), Gagnon (2012) or Artige and Cavenaile (2011)). These tentative
explanations have focused on long-term determinants of global imbalances. However, the
last three highlighted facts seem to pinpoint a link between financial crises and sudden
changes in saving behavior in particular.
The objective of the present paper is to build a framework able to explain both the reversal
in the current account balance experienced by the EME countries in 1998 and the strong
reduction in global imbalances when the financial crisis hit the western economies at
the end of the 2000s. We thus consider a two-country overlapping generations (OLG)
model with exchange rates, in which firms may face liquidity constraints when households
change the reallocation of their resources to short-term sovereign assets. Our paper is
related to Jappelli and Pagano (1994) who consider an overlapping generations economy
where households are credit constrained. Our model is also a deterministic framework
but focuses on credit to firms and examine the effect of liquidity constraints to the firms
1Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) emphasize that the absolute value of the current accounts by
country as a percentage of world GDP was relatively stable from 1970 to 1996 and started to increase
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Figure 1: Current account balance as a percentage of world output (1980-2017)
on current accounts. If households have the choice between a short-term non-productive
sovereign asset and a long-term productive corporate asset, any change in this allocation
between the two will affect liquidity supplied to the firms. In an open-economy framework,
this reallocation has also an impact on the current account.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the two-country overlapping gen-
erations model with exchange rates and presents the dynamic equilibrium in an open
economy. Section 3 analyzes the steady-state current account balances when tastes and
population growth rates differ across countries and when the exchange rate is manipulated.
Section 4 examines global imbalances in the two-country model, and studies the existence
of an intertemporal equilibrium with exchange rate and different time preferences. The
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Figure 2: Gross national saving and investment as a percentage of GDP (1980-2017)
2 A Two-Country Model
2.1 Setup
We consider a discrete-time deterministic model of an economy consisting of two countries,
country A and country B, producing the same good under perfect competition from date
t = 0 to infinity. We assume that country A stands for a group of emerging economy and
country B is the group of the most advanced countries. Like in Buiter (1981) we assume
that there is no international trade in the consumption goods. The balance of payments is
thus reduced to the financial balance only, which is the symmetric account of the current
account. Each country is populated by overlapping generations living for three periods.
We assume that the population grows at a constant rate nA in country A and at a constant
rate nB in country B. When young, individuals supply inelastically one unit of labor to
the firms, receive a wage and allocate this income between consumption, short-term saving
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and long-term saving. They consume the return on their short-term non-productive asset
when middle-aged and the return on their long-term productive asset when old. The labor
market is perfectly competitive within the national borders while physical capital moves
freely across countries when capital markets integrate. The representative firm in each





i,t , i = A,B, (1)
where Ki,t is the stock of capital, Li,t is the labor input, and Ai represents total factor
productivity in country i at time t. We assume that physical capital fully depreciates
after one period. At time t, the representative firm of country i has an installed stock
of capital Ki,t, chooses the labor input paid at the competitive wage wi,t, equal to the







i,t − wi,tLi,t, (2)
where pii,t = Ri,tKi,t are the profits distributed to the owners of the capital stock and Ri,t
the real interest factor, which is equal to the marginal product of capital. Since returns




where ki,t ≡ Ki,t/Li,t is the capital-labor ratio.
The representative agent of country (i) maximizes a logarithmic additively separable
utility function
Ui = ln ci,t + β ln di,t+1 + φiβ
2 ln ei,t+2 (4)
subject to the budget constraints
ci,t = wi,t − si,t − zi,t (5)
di,t+1 = Ri,t+1zi,t − vt+1 (6)
ei,t+2 = Ri,t+1Ri,t+2si,t +Ri,t+2vt+1 (7)
cA,t, dA,t+1, eA,t+2 > 0 (8)









where ci,t, di,t+1 and ei,t+2 are consumption levels when the individuals of country i are
respectively young, middle-aged and old and β is the psychological discount factor. The
individuals work when young and earn a wage equal to wi,t. They earn the interest factor
Ri,t+1 on their short-term saving at time t+ 1 and earn the interest factor Ri,t+1Ri,t+2 on
their long-term saving when old. We assume that the short-term saving is the purchase
of a sovereign asset issued by the government to finance public expenditure while the
long-term saving is the purchase of a corporate asset issued by the firms. The maturities
of the sovereign and the corporate assets are, respectively, one and two periods. All assets
are assumed to be held until maturity. Therefore, the sovereign asset is more liquid than
the corporate asset. The parameter φi ∈ ]0, 1] depicts the individuals’s aversion to the
less liquid assets. When φi decreases, the preference for liquidity increases and so does
the credit constraint on the firms.
3 The Autarkic Equilibrium
In this section, we assume that the national economies are closed economies. The maxi-
mization of (4) with respect to (9) yields the following first-order conditions:
di,t+1 = βRi,t+1ci,t (10)
ei,t+2 = φiβRi,t+2di,t+1 (11)
Therefore, the optimal levels of individual short-term and long-term saving are:
zi,t =
β





1 + β + φiβ2
wi,t, (13)
where si,t = φiβzi,t. When the preference for liquidity increases (lower φi), short-term
saving zi,t increases relative to long-term saving si,t.
The optimal levels of consumption at each period are:
ci,t =
1









1 + β + φiβ2
Ri,t+1Ri,t+2wi,t (16)
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The capital market is composed of two markets: the market for non-productive sovereign
assets and the market for productive corporate assets. The capital market equilibrium is
characterized by:
Ii,t = Li,tsi,t (17)
Bi,t = Li,tzi,t (18)
where Ii,t is corporate investment and Bi,t is the total assets issued by the government
at time t. Equation (17) describes the equilibrium in the corporate asset market and
Equation (18) the equilibrium in the sovereign market. We assume that the capital stock
fully depreciates after two periods. Therefore, these asset flows lead to the following
stocks:
Ki,t+2 = Ii,t (19)















1 + β + φiβ2
wi,t (22)
where ki,t ≡ Ki,tLi,t is the capital-labor ratio and bi,t ≡
Bi,t
Li,t
is the debt-labor ratio. The
optimal factor prices at time t are
wi,t = (1− α)Aikαi,t (23)
Ri,t−1Ri,t = αAikα−1i,t , (24)
where the rate of return on long-term saving is the compound interest over two periods.








It can easily verified that the return on two successive sovereign assets is equal to the













The capital stock per worker at time t is indeed equal to the share in income per capita at
t−2. Substituting for the optimal expressions of wi,t and Ri,t+1, we can rewrite Equations













is the constant population growth rate.
When the aversion to illiquidity increases (lower φi), long-term saving decreases and so
does investment, all else equal. However, the purchase of short-term assets and present
consumption increase.









The lower φi, the tighter is the liquidity constraint on the corporate sector. Moreover, the
lower φi, the lower k¯i. Any increase in the liquidity constraint (lower φi) reduces capital













The effect of a decrease in φi on b¯i is ambiguous. We can show that the effect is positive
if α < β2φi and negative otherwise. In fact, a decrease in φi lowers k¯i, which affects
negatively b¯i while it increases the propensity to save in the sovereign asset. The total
effect depends on the magnitude of the capital share in income (which affects the part
of the wage that is saved) and of β2φi which affects the propensity to invest in physical
capital. If we rule out unrealistic extreme cases (high values of α and low values of β and
φ), then we can conclude that the effect of a decrease in φi on b¯i is positive.
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4 The Open-Economy Equilibrium
We now assume that capital can freely move across countries. We also assume that the
individuals in the world prefer the asset markets of country B (AE countries) to that of
country A (EME countries). Therefore,
kB,t = λkA,t (32)
bB,t = λbA,t (33)
where λ > 1. If the sovereign debts were perfect substitutes, λ would equal to one and
the individuals in both countries would be indifferent in purchasing assets in country A
or country B. When λ > 1, there is a preference for the assets in country B.
The equilibrium in the world goods market at period t is given by the world income
accounts identity:
YA,t + YB,t = LA,tcA,t + LA,t−1dA,t + LA,t−2eA,t + IA,t + LB,tcB,t +
+ LB,t−1dB,t + LB,t−2eB,t + IB,t, (34)
where the world output is equal to the aggregate consumption of the young, the middle-
aged and the old generations and the aggregate investment in both countries. Full depreci-
ation of the current capital stock in each country implies IA,t = KA,t+2 and IB,t = KB,t+2.
It is assumed that the owners of the capital stock at date t = 0 and t = 1 in both coun-
tries cannot move this stock from one country to the other. The integration of capital
markets thus occurs at date t = 2. The equilibrium in the international capital market,
once capital is mobile across countries, derives from (34) and yields:
IA,t + IB,t = LA,tsA,t + LB,tsB,t (35)
BA,t +BB,t = LA,tzA,t + LB,tzB,t (36)
Let us rewrite the equilibrium in the capital markets in terms of stocks:
KA,t+2 +KB,t+2 = IA,t + IB,t (37)
BA,t+1 +BB,t+1 = RA,t+1BA,t +RB,t+1BB,t (38)
Although there is perfect mobility in the international capital market, the assets in country
A and country B are not perfect substitutes since there is a world preference for the assets
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in country B. Moreover, the equilibrium in the capital market requires real interest parity.







where t is the real exchange rate between country A and country B at time t. We assume
that 0 < t+1
t
<∞ to eliminate uninteresting degenerate capital market equilibria. If the
foreign exchange market is perfect and without country intervention, the ratio t+1
t
equals
1. Let us define that an increase in t corresponds to a real appreciation of the currency of
country A and a real depreciation of the currency of country B. The equilibrium condition































If the law of one price applies for all periods the equilibrium condition in the capital market
is the same as in the nonmonetary economy. If the real exchange rate, t, decreases over
time (i.e. if country A’s currency depreciates in real terms) then the real return on
capital in country B gets higher. Interest parity is reestablished either if capital moves
from country A to country B, which raises the interest rate in country A and reduces it
in country B, or if there is an adjustment of the nominal exchange rate (i.e. a nominal
depreciation of country A’s currency), or a combination of the two.
By using Equations (13), (37) and (40), we can compute the intertemporal equilibrium




















































where 0 is assumed to be equal to 1. An increase in 2 (i.e. an appreciation of the
currency of country A at time t = 2) yields an increase in kA,2 and a decrease in kB,2.
When capital markets integrate, the country that will experience an appreciation of it
currency in the future attracts foreign saving, which leads to an increase in its capital
stock (or a decrease in its marginal productivity). If the preference for liquidity increases
in any of the two countries (lower φi), the effect is always negative on kA,2 and kB,2. The








































We can observe that an increase in the preference for liquidity (lower φi) in any country
yields higher bA,2 and bB,2. The effect of a currency appreciation is also clear: the demand
for the sovereign bond increases in the country where the currency appreciate. Moreover,
when the world preference for country B’s asset market increases (an increase in λ), the
demand for sovereign assets issued by country B increases, all else equal, and the demand
for sovereign assets issued by country A decreases. After the capital market integration
(t > 2), the intertemporal equilibrium with perfect foresight for a generation born at time


































































































When capital markets are integrated, an appreciation of the currency in country A has
a negative effect on bA,t+1. It is a consequence of the positive effect of this appreciation
on kA,t+1, which lowers the return on capital. The dynamics of the capital stock per
worker and of the sovereign asset per worker leads to a steady state if the condition in
the following proposition is met:
Proposition 1 In a two-country model with overlapping generations living for three peri-
ods with integrated capital markets, the intertemporal equilibrium admits a unique globally
stable interior steady state provided that the dynamics of the real interest rate over time
is linear.
Proof: k¯i is stationary if and only if
t+1
t
is a constant for any t. Let us say that this
constant is θ.





























































When purchasing power parity is satisfied, θ = 1 and the steady state does not depend





































The level of the sovereign asset at the steady state and away from the steady state depends
on φi and λ the preference for the advanced country’s sovereign market.
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5 The Balance of Payments
In an open two-country world, a country can finance domestic investment by foreign
saving. The difference between domestic investment and domestic saving is equal to
the current account balance. In other words, a country can spend more or less than it
produces. The national income accounts identity of country i in this two-country economy
is
Yi,t +Ri,t−1Ri,t (Li,t−2si,t−2 −Ki,t) + Ri,t (Li,t−1zi,t−1 −Bi,t−1) = Li,tci,t + Li,t−1di,t +
+ Li,t−2ei,t +Gi,t +Ki,t+2 +Gi,t, (55)
where Yi,t and [Ri,t−1Ri,t (Li,t−2si,t−2 −Ki,t)+Ri,t (Li,t−1zi,t−1 −Bi,t−1)] are the Gross Do-
mestic Product (GDP) and the net factor income from abroad respectively, and the sum
of the two is the Gross National Income (GNI) of country i at time t. On the right hand
side of the identity, Gi,t is the difference between domestic spending on foreign capital and
foreign spending on domestic capital. In this model of one single good in each country,
where there is no trade in consumption goods and there are no unilateral transfers, Gi,t is
the current account balance of country i at time t. This is simply the difference between
the factor income from abroad and the factor income payments to the foreign country. In
intensive form, taking into account the fact that yi,t = wi,t + Ri,tki,t, the current account
balance is equal to














or, equivalently, since di,t = Ri,tzi,t−1 and ei,t = Rt−1Rtsi,t−2,
gi,t = si,t − (1 + ni)2ki,t+2 + zi,t − bi,t (57)
The current account per worker gi,t is equal to the difference between domestic short-term
and long-term saving, on the one hand, and the sale of domestic corporate and sovereign
assets to the world on the other hand. Short-term saving thus crowds out corporate
investment. The higher the short-term saving, the tighter the constraint is on credit to
firms. However, for an emerging or a developing country concerned about avoiding a
balance of payments crisis, an external deficit in the corporate sector can be offset by an
external surplus in the sovereign sector. In other words, for EME countries, there may
be a tradeoff between income growth and external financial stability. As for the effect of
demographics, higher population dynamics has a negative effect on the current account,
all else equal. At the steady state, the current account per worker becomes
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gi,t = s¯i − (1 + ni)2k¯i + z¯i − b¯i, (58)
where Equation (58) depends on the following parameters: the ratio of technological levels
(AA/AB), the real exchange rate, the population growth rate, the liquidity preference
parameter φi and λ, the preference for the advanced country’ sovereign market. The
existence of a steady-state for the current account also depends on the existence of the
steady-state k¯i, i.e. if the dynamics of the real interest rate is constant.
6 Capital market integration and current account
Assume that country A and country B are identical in all respects except for the level
of initial development: kA,0 < kB,0 and kA,1 < kB,1. All other parameters, including
the preference for liquidity φi, are the same across countries. We also assume that the
population sizes are identical for any t and λ = 1 (perfect substitution in assets across
countries). The world economy starts at time t = 0 when capital markets are not inte-
grated yet. Capital markets integrate at t = 2. Without loss of generality, we will focus
on the current account of country A, the less developed country.
6.1 Flexible exchange rate
In this section, we will assume that exchange rates are flexible and, hence, purchasing
power parity is verified at all periods. In the model, this implies that θ = 1.
Proposition 2 In a two-country model with overlapping generations living for three pe-
riods and with two types of assets, in which both countries are identical except for the
initial level of development, the less developed country A experiences a current account
deficit when capital markets integrate and a balanced current account at the steady state.
Proof: Under autarky at times t = 0 and t = 1, short-term saving is equal to the supply
of sovereign assets and long-term saving is equal to investment in physical capital. Since
kA,t < kB,t the return on short-term and long-term saving is higher in country A than in
country B. Therefore, when capital markets integrate at time t = 2, country A attracts
foreign saving in the sovereign and corporate asset markets. A current account deficit
thus ensues for this country. At the steady state, the economy of country A converges to
that of country b and the current accounts are balanced.
Let us modify two assumptions: the population growth rate now is higher in country A
and there is a preference for country B’s asset markets, λ > 1. The result is that the
current account deficit of country A is reduced at time t = 2 is reduced when capital
markets integrate. Higher demographic dynamics implies a lower capital stock per worker
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at time t = 2 and its difference with saving per worker is smaller and the current account
deficit diminishes. If λ > 1, country A is less attractive for foreign saving when capital
markets integrate and, hence, its current account deficit is lower. At the steady state,
the current accounts are no longer balanced. If population grows faster in country A, it
current account will be in deficit. If λ > 1, saving from country A is used to purchase
assets in country B. The current account of country A is therefore in surplus.
6.2 Fixed exchange rate
We now assume that country A pegs its currency to country B’s currency in order to
control the real exchange rate dynamics. We thus consider the situation when θ < 1 for
all t, which implies that country A’s currency depreciates in real terms over time.
Proposition 3 In a two-country model with overlapping generations living for three peri-
ods and with two types of assets, in which both countries are identical except for the initial
level of development, the less developed country A experiences a current account deficit
when its currency depreciates over time both at the time of capital markets integration
and at the steady state.
Proof: Equations (43) and (44) make clear that the impact of the depreciation of coun-
try A’s currency on the level of capital stock per worker is negative in country A and
positive in country B when capital markets integrate. Its effects are the same on the
sovereign assets (see Equations (45) and (46)). Therefore, a currency depreciation allows
the less developed country to diminish its current account deficit when capital markets
integrate. This result holds true at the steady state. As a result, there is a tradeoff
between income per capita and current account management.
7 Tighter liquidity constraint in EME economies
Households allocate saving between the short-term non-productive sovereign assets and
the long-term productive assets. We now assume that the preference for liquidity in
country A is higher than in country B. Therefore, we have φA < φB. An increase in
the preference for liquidity means a tighter liquidity constraint on the firms. This has a
negative impact on capital accumulation. However, the effect on the current account is
positive.
7.1 Flexible exchange rate
Proposition 4 In a two-country model with overlapping generations living for three peri-
ods and with two types of assets, in which countries differ in the initial level of development
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and the preference for liquidity, a reallocation of saving towards the short-term sovereign
assets in the less developed country has a positive effect on its current account both at the
time of capital markets integration and at the steady state.
Proof: It can be shown that
dgA,t
dφA
< 0 both at the time of capital markets integration
and at the steady state. This means that a decrease in φA has a positive impact on
country A’s current account and a negative impact on country B’s current account.
Before 1998, the emerging and developing countries as a group recorded current account
deficits (see Figure 1). After many balance-of-payments crises in the 1990s, this group of
countries, although less developed than the advanced countries, started to record current
account surpluses, in contradiction with the predictions of the neoclassical growth theory.
The turning point occurred in 1998. If we consider that the balance-of-payments crises
triggered a reallocation of saving towards short-term assets, our framework shows that if
these short-term assets finance non-productive assets, capital accumulation slows down
but the current account improves. Our framework does not explain the increase in the
saving rate observed in many EME countries after 1998 but account for the allocation of
saving away from productive assets, the so-called ”saving glut”. Moreover, if we further
consider that the balance-of-payments crises increased the preference for the western asset
markets (increase in λ), the reallocation of saving towards the western asset markets and
towards the non-productive assets in emerging countries represented a key change in the
current account dynamics in these countries. The advanced countries benefitted from this
change as their interest rates declined at record lows.
7.2 Fixed exchange rate
Adding a fixed exchange rate system in the previous framework allows to add another
element in the reversal in the current accounts of the EME countries after 1998.
Proposition 5 In a two-country model with overlapping generations living for three peri-
ods and with two types of assets, in which countries differ in the initial level of development
and the preference for liquidity, a currency depreciation in the less developed country re-
inforces the positive effect on its current account of a reallocation of saving towards the
short-term sovereign assets both at the time of capital markets integration and at the
steady state.
Proof: It can be shown that
dgA,t
dθ
< 0 both at the time of capital markets integration
and at the steady state.
Currency depreciations in emerging countries after 1998 also contributed to the improve-
ment of the current accounts.
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8 Tighter liquidity constraints in advanced economies
The financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 breaks out in the United States and rapidly spreads
over Europe. This crisis triggered a reallocation of saving towards short-term assets in
the western economies. In our framework, we assume a decrease in φB but also a increase
in λ, the preference for the asset markets of the advanced countries. Therefore, the
effects of a financial crisis in the advanced countries and the emerging economies are
not symmetric. The current financial crisis illustrates the strong asymmetry between
the advanced economies and the emerging economies. When a financial crisis hits the
advanced economies, the world still trust their sovereign debt markets and even reinforces
its preference for them.
8.1 Flexible exchange rate
Proposition 6 In a two-country model with overlapping generations living for three peri-
ods and with two types of assets, in which countries differ in the initial level of development
and the preference for liquidity, a reallocation of saving towards the short-term sovereign
assets in the advanced country has a positive effect on its current account both at the time
of capital markets integration and at the steady state. However, a simultaneous increase
in the preference for the advanced asset markets has a negative impact on the advanced
country’s current account.






< 0 both at the time of
capital markets integration and at the steady state.
After the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008, the large current account deficits of the ad-
vanced countries have reduced sharply but have not turned into surpluses. Therefore, the
pattern of current accounts did not return to pre-1998 situation despite the magnitude
of the crisis in the western economies. We argue that two effects are at work on the
current accounts. One is reducing the current account deficit by reallocating saving away
from productive assets and one is increasing it by maintaining the preference for western
markets over the emerging ones.
8.2 Fixed exchange rate
Finally, we can add the effect of the fixed exchange rate to the current account of the
advanced country. At a time of very low nominal interest rates in western countries, it is
very unlikely that the pegged currencies of the emerging countries can further depreciate.




The objective of this paper is to build a framework to account for the salient facts of the
international monetary system: the reversal of the current accounts in the emerging and
developing countries in 1998, global imbalances in the 2000s and its sharp reduction when
the financial crisis erupted in the western economies in 2007 and 2008. Our framework
includes two types of assets: a short-term non-productive sovereign asset and and a long-
term productive corporate asset. We argue that a reallocation of saving towards the
short-term asset triggered by a period of financial strain can cause both a slowdown of
physical capital accumulation and an improvement in the current account. Moreover, we
show that currency pegs are not only an instrument to promote growth through exports
but also an instrument to stave off external financial crises.
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